Research

My work asks how coordination emerges and is sustained across markets, societies, and organizations. In some projects, I study conditions that make collusion feasible, such as employee movement and focal points; in others, I examine how team composition, norms, and accountability shape cooperation. My broader goal is to generate evidence that is both theoretically grounded and practically useful in understanding how teams and institutions shape economic and social outcomes.

Working Papers

Job Market Paper- Collusion through worker movement: An experiment (with Peter McGee) 

The primary difference between the definitions explicit and tacit collusion in the literature is that the firms communicate directly in the former and do not communicate in the latter.  Collusion is easier to establish and maintain with explicit collusion than tacit collusion, but it also comes with increased risks of detection and legal penalties.  We investigate a gray area between these two, where collusion occurs through workers moving between firms.  In experimental Bertrand markets with either two or four firms, workers moving between firms lead to higher market prices, higher firm prices, more attempts at collusive pricing, and more frequent market sharing.  The effects of worker mobility is more pronounced in the four firm market where collusion should be more difficult to achieve.  Using team chats, we can see that, while subjects rarely discuss specific collusive prices, they often discuss trying to encourage everyone to raise prices.

Strangers Like Me: Does Group Affiliation Serve as a Noisy Signal of Agents’ Types? (with J. Braxton Gately, and Ashley McCrea)

Research In Progress

Focal point collusion, teams, and industry-specific human capital (with Peter McGee)

Personality, Gender, and Price Competition: Evidence from a Bertrand Experiment (Analysis)

Corporate Culture in the Lab (with Peter McGee) (Design)

Strategic Timing of Disclosure in Competitive R&D: An Experiment (Planning)

Teams, Goal setting & Monitoring: An Education Experiment (Planning)