My work asks how coordination emerges and is sustained across markets, societies, and organizations. In some projects, I study conditions that make collusion feasible, such as employee movement and focal points; in others, I examine how team composition, norms, and accountability shape cooperation. My broader goal is to generate evidence that is both theoretically grounded and practically useful in understanding how teams and institutions shape economic and social outcomes.
Working Papers
Collusion through worker movement: An experiment (with Peter McGee) [PDF]
Strangers Like Me: Does Group Affiliation Serve as a Noisy Signal of Agents’ Types? (with J. Braxton Gately, and Ashley McCrea) [PDF]
Research In Progress
The Missing Ingredient : Price Ceilings, Employee Movement and Focal Point Collusion (with Peter McGee)
Analysis & Writing in ProgressPersonality, Gender, and Price Competition: Evidence from a Bertrand Experiment
Analysis & Writing in Progress